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Overview
For several years a debate has taken place in the pages of this
Journal and elsewhere, concerning the independence of the
administrative judiciary in the United States. It would be fair to
characterize the debate as one that focuses on the role of the
administrative law judge as a public servant - a public servant who
must accomplish two oftentimes conflicting goals. The ALJ typically
is possessed of an unusually thorough familiarity with government
operations of one sort or another: she may know foster care rules for the
State of Oklahoma better than virtually any judge or lawyer in her state;
he may have been with the Social Security Administration through
cyclical contractions and expansions, acquiring along the way a history
of legislative expressions of intent that few can equal. This expertise
is then linked (typically, although not always) with formal training in
the law and the juris doctorate. Take this extraordinary command over
governmental policies and systems, and add to it the lawyer's
knowledge of American judicial systems, and you have the typical ALJ.
At the same time, this public servant is also responsible for
conducting hearings and rendering judgments, and the hearings and
judgments possess many of the attributes of traditional adjudications:
there are winners and losers, people lose government benefits or are
barred from practicing their chosen professions or denied the
opportunity to earn a livelihood in their field, agencies find they must
abandon long-standing approaches to carrying out fledgling and
sometimes poorly thought-out legislation, and the public is at times left
to wonder how the ALJ ever came up with the decision that reaches the
newspapers. Familiarity with the agency's policies and its systems is
useful in this regard, but the ALJ cannot simply defer to the agency; the
task at hand is to impartially adjudicate the controversy, even though
the outcome may be at odds with the result sought by the agency.
It is thus perhaps not surprising that articles here and in other
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journals have considered the ramifications of independence and
accountability in our chosen profession.' If she is to faithfilly carry out
her role as an adjudicator, the ALJ must strive to be free of
overreaching by the agency she is serving. At the same time, in all
likelihood the ALJ has attained her judicial position in large measure
because she has a greater than average familiarity with the programs,
policies, and regulations of the agency, and is probably closely tied to
the government administrator charged with implementing those
programs.
The National Administrative Law Judge Foundation 1997
Fellowship
The 1997 Fellowship awarded by the National Administrative
Law Judge Foundation was to focus on "the similarities and differences
between judges in the judicial branch and the executive branch."2 This
article will review these similarities and differences first by discussing
the two adjudicative structures in terms of organic components (how
each are created, organized, and abolished) and then in terms of
operations (the functions, duties, and powers of the judges of both
branches). To assist in this discussion, I will consult analyses of the
judicial branch that have helped define how that branch differs from the
executive and legislative branches of our tripartite system of
government. On the other hand, the judges of the executive branch
operate most often under one or more provisions of the state version of
'See e.g., Lori Kyle Endris and Wayne E. Penrod, "Judicial Independence in
Administrative Adjudication: Indiana's Environmental Solution," 12 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL
COmiMENT. 125 (1996); Edwin L. Felter, Jr. "Maintaining the Balance Between Judicial
Independence and Judicial Accountability in Administrative Law," 17 J.N.A.A.L.J. 89 (1997);
Elaine Golin, "Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in Administrative Action," 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1532 (1995); John Hardwicke and Ronnie A. Yoder, "Does Mandatory
Quality Assurance Oversight of ALJ Decisions Violate ALJ Decisional Independence, Due
Process or Ex Parte Prohibitions?" 17 J.N.A.A.L.J. 75 (1997); Richard B. Hoffnan and Frank
P. Cihlar, "Judicial Independence: Can It Be Without Article IlT' 46 MERCER L. REv. 863
(1995); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, "The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate
System of Performance Evaluations for ALJs," 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589 (1994); Bernard
Schwartz, "Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act," 32 TULSA L.J. 203 (1996);
Russell L. Weaver, "Unification of the Administrative Adjudicatory Process: An Emerging
Framework to Increase 'Judicialization' in Pennsylvania," 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 297 (1995).2See 16 J.N.A.A.L.J. inside cover, Winter 1996.
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the Model Administrative Procedure Act3 or, at the federal level, the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act.4 Thus, the article considers how
those acts offer provisions similar to or distinct from the judicial branch
counterparts.
One result of making such an analysis is that the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the administrative judiciary are raised to
the surface, more visible when contrasted with the article III and
constitutional judiciary. Preeminent in what makes the administrative
judiciary vulnerable to charges that it does not deliver substantial
justice is the charge, quite valid in some cases, that the administrative
adjudicator is not insulated from the agency she serves. The charge is
based on the existence of a relationship between the executive
adjudicator and the agency served by the adjudicator, a relationship that
is significantly different from that existing between judges of the
judicial branch and the source of judicial authority (be it constitutional
or statutory). This shortcoming, tolerated under the original and revised
versions of the Model Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, implicates the very basic requirement
that all who come before executive adjudicators be given "a fair trial in
a fair tribunal."5
In past presentations of Fellowship papers, and in other articles
offered by those deeply committed to improving the practice of
administrative law, our colleagues have begun to frame the debate by
articulating the need for decisional independence on the one hand and,
on the other hand, the need for management of ALJs to better utilize the
finite amount of adjudicative resources available to the governmental
administrator. Next year's Fellowship recipient will sharpen the debate
by directly addressing the topic of maintaining an independent
administrative judiciary.
Before we reach that point, before we draw some clear lines as
3Uniform Law Commissioners' Model State Administrative Proc. Act (1981) (West
1997).
45 USC §§ 551 et seq. (1994)
'In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
Vol. XVIII Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 6
thresholds over which we shall not willingly cross, we may benefit
from an analysis that focuses on the differences between the ALJ and
other judges. Such an analysis would identify key components of the
administrative adjudication process, explore how those components
have evolved and why they exist in their present form; it would
compare those components to similar structures in the other judiciary
(be it the true article III court or courts of general jurisdiction at the
state level). If properly crafted, the comparison should offer some
insight into what distinguishes the different judicial engines; and that
insight, in turn, should help focus our debate on components of the
administrative judicial engine that must be protected at all cost, if we
are to maintain decisional integrity while still providing effective and
efficient service to the public and our employers.
Why Distinguish Between the Judicial and Executive Judge?
It is one thing to articulate the differences between judges of the
judicial branch and the those in the executive branch; yet it is quite
another thing to use a discussion of those differences in a productive
way. The instinctive defensive reaction to a claim that the
administrative adjudicator is controlled by the agency she serves may
be to raise the vigorous assertion that due process requires the ALJ be
independent of the agency she serves.6 The distinctions between judges
of the judicial branch and those of the executive branch are such,
however, as to call into question such a conclusion. At the outset, it is
important to note the distinctions that courts have already made that set
apart the executive judiciary from the judicial branch adjudicators: that
"[a]dministrative decisionmakers do not bear all the badges of
independence that characterize an Article III judge, but they are held to
the same standard of impartial decisionmaking."7 Though it may be
appealing for ALJs to believe they must operate independent of their
agency, constitutional jurisprudence does not support a claim that due
process mandates such independence. Rather, if we conclude that as
6See, e.g., Ann Marshall Young, "Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges:
Premises, Means, and Ends," 17 J.N.A.A.L.J. 1, 21-31 (1997).
7Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330, citing Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188,
195 (1982); and Hummel v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir.1984).
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ALJs we must "avoid, and should be shielded as much as possible from,
any influences that might in any way compromise such independence,
neutrality, and impartiality" as Judge Young has recommended,' we
must find bases for this mandate other than those found in the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.
Shortcomings inherent in the adjudicative process under the
Model APA are well-known, and have been the subject of more than a
decade of work by members of the National Conference of
Administrative Law Judges, the Judicial Division of the American Bar
Association, the National Association of Administrative Law Judges,
and many other institutions and individuals.9 This Fellowship paper is
part of that effort. In fulfilling its mandate to "enhance the quality of
administrative justice and . . . improve the process of dispute
resolution,"' the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
adopted a Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency.I In the
third part of this article, I discuss the provisions found in the Model Act
as it was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association. 2 This Model Act offers what I conclude to be a
significant tool for addressing the two concerns described at the
beginning of this Paper. The Model Act Creating a State Central
Hearing Agency calls for creation of a cadre of administrative law
judges who are simultaneously independent of the agencies they serve
and yet fully accountable for their professional service in the executive
branch. When viewed in the light created by a careful comparison
between the role of judges in the judicial and executive judiciary, it
'Young, supra note 7, at 24.
'See e.g., Karen Y. Kauper, "Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law
Judges: A Model Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute," 18 U. MICH. L. REv 537 (1985);
Karen S. Lewis, "Administrative Law Judges and the Code of Judicial Conduct: A Need for
Regulated Ethics," 94 DICK. L. REv. 929 (1990); Victor W. Palmer, "The Administrative
Procedure Act: After 40 Years, Still Searching for Independence," 26 JUDGEs' J. 34 (1986);
Paul R. Verkuil, "Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary," 39 UCLA L. REV.
1341 (1992).
1017 J.N.A.A.L.J. at 1 (1997).
"16 J.N.A.A.L.J. at 121 (1996).
'
2Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency, Adopted by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association, February 3, 1997, 17 J.N.A.A.L.J. 309, 309-321
(1997).
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becomes clear that the innovations found in the Model Act are a
significant step towards ensuring the administrative tribunal is both fair
and efficient.
Creation of the Executive and Judicial Branch Judiciaries
What Makes a "Court" a Court?
If we take for our definition of courts that a court "is an organ
of the government, consisting of one or more persons authorized to
administer justice," 3 then we should at the outset distinguish courts
from administrative adjudicative tribunals. While agency hearing
examiners and administrative law judges may hear and determine facts,
and from those determinations make conclusions with respect to law,
the agency adjudicator is part of the executive branch of the
government, and is not a "court.' 4 Agency tribunals do not have the
power to punish contempts, which is one of the inherent powers of a
court. 5  The administrative adjudication process also tends to be
prospectively oriented, announcing rules to be followed based on laws
passed by the legislature, whereas the function of courts is narrower,
usually addressing themselves to problems only after the fact.'6
Ultimately, the state constitution is the source of authority for
all judicial power in a state.'7 The federal Constitution does restrict the
power of a state to determine the limits of state court jurisdiction;"
however, those provisions of the federal Constitution defining the
extent of judicial power are inapplicable to the judicial power of state
1320 Am. Jur.2d Courts § 1 (1995), citing Wood v. Circuit Court of Warren County,
331 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D Tenn. 1971).
1
4Rommell v. Walsh, 15 A.2d 6 (Conn. 1940); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 1 (1995).
'
5Hernreich v. Quinn, 168 S.W.2d 1054 (Mo. 1943).
"See York v. Commonwealth 815 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. App. 1991); 20 Am. Jur. 2d
Courts § 1 (1995).
1121 C.J.S. Courts § 93 (1990); See, e.g., City of Sapulpa v. Land, 223 P. 640 (Okla.
1924).
"21 C.J.S. Courts § 93 (1990); See, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry.
Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934) (privileges and immunities clause, article 4, § 2, cl. 1, requires a state
to accord to citizens of other states substantially the same right of access to its courts as it
accords to its own citizens).
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courts.' 9 The jurisdiction of a given tribunal is regulated either by the
state constitution or by statutes enacted pursuant to the state
constitution.2" This attribute of courts also controls legislative efforts to
abolish, reorganize, divide, or consolidate constitutional courts, as well
as attempts to alter, destroy, increase, or diminish the essentials of the
jurisdiction, functions, or judicial powers of those courts (including
inherent powers or functions).2 Remaining with the legislature,
however, is the power to establish the jurisdiction of constitutional
courts, increase, diminish, or change their jurisdiction, confer on them
additional jurisdiction, provided doing so is not prohibited by the state
constitution and does not abridge the inherent powers of the court.22
The Creation of Agency Adjudicative Bodies
One attribute of the power to confer judicial authority is the
power to confer in an administrative body mixed administrative and
quasi-judicial functions. 23 This mixture of executive and judicial
authority is the sine qua non of the administrative tribunal.
Characteristic of such tribunals is a focus on public rights, rather than
private rights, although private rights may be directly affected by the
decision of the tribunal.24 The tribunal typically applies special
knowledge acquired through continuous experience in difficult and
complicated fields, and often the adjudicator is retained because of his
or her greater than average ability to weigh intangibles associated with
the subject matter, an ability that often results from specialization in the
921 C.J.S. Courts § 93 (1990); See, e.g., Randolph v. Fricke, 35 S.W.2d 912 (Mo.
1930), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 833 (1931).
2021 C.J.S. Courts § 94 (1990); See, e.g., Seventh Urban, Inc. v. University Circle
Property Development, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 1070 (Ohio 1981).
2121 C.J.S. Courts § 95 (1990).
22Id.
232 1 C.J.S. Courts § 101 (1990); See, e.g., Erie Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'r,
98 A. 13 (N.J. 1916).
24L. Harold Levinson, "The Public Law/Private Law Distinction in the Courts," 57
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1579 (1989) (noting the differences in the doctrine of immunity, in the
procedures, and in the prosecutorial roles associated with the public law forum, observing the
important attributes that are peculiarly public in nature - the power of taxation, eminent
domain, law enforcement, etc. - are linked to peculiarly governmental liabilities and
responsibilities - due process and the duty of rational decision making - and considering the
role courts have in balancing between the public and private legal environments).
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field of interest to the agency, applying insight gained through
experience in the field.25
The agency adjudicative forum, like the agency itself, must be
created by constitution, statute, agency action, or executive order.26
Once established, the agency may control its judicial work through
legislation patterned after the Model Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)27 or, at the federal level, may be subject to the provisions of the
federal Administrative Procedure Act (FAPA).2"
To understand how the role of the ALJ differs from that of an
article III type ofjudge, it helps to narrow our focus a bit: the reference
to an article III type of judge is one that arises because article III of the
United States Constitution provides for the appointment of federal
judges. The preeminent characteristic of this provision is that it
attempts to assure the creation of an independent judiciary. How does
it do so? It offers time, and money. This is the well-spring, from which
the promise of eternal employment flows. Article III, section one of the
Constitution provides that "the judicial Power of the United States shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The next
sentence specifies that the judges of both "the supreme and inferior"
courts shall enjoy life tenure and that their salaries may not be
diminished during their continuance in office. This brings us to our
first distinction: at the federal level, the article III judge enjoys the
safeguards of life tenure and undiminished salary.29
In the context of the theme of this Fellowship topic, the two
salient article III characteristics of lifetime tenure and undiminished
salary are significant. The public perception of justice requires both
accountability from our courts and judicial independence. Justice
2573 C.J.S. Pub. Admin. Law and Proc. § 9 (1983); See F.C.C. v. R.C.A.
Communications Comm'n, 346 U.S. 86 (1953).26See generally, 2 Am. Jur. 2d Admin. Law § 24 (1994).
27Uniform Law Comm'n Model State Admin. Procedure Act (1981) (West 1997).
2855 U.S.C.S. § 551 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1997).
9U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; See Stephen G. Breyer, "Judicial Independence in the
United States," 40 ST. LOUIS UNrv. L. J. 989, 989-90 (1996).
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Blackmun, writing in Freytag v. Comm. of Internal Revenue,3 ° makes
the point that the concern over judicial independence was an integral
part of our constitutional architecture. In a case that reviews the
structure of the United States Tax Court and centers on whether the
Chief Judge of that court may make appointments for special trial
judges, Justice Blackmun recalls the notion of how the separation of
governmental powers is expected to preserve judicial independence.
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2,
provides:
He [the President]... shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.3
Thus, the Constitution limits congressional discretion to vest
power to appoint "inferior Officers" to three sources: "the President
alone," "the Heads of Departments," and "the Courts of Law."
In Freytag, Petitioners argue that a special trial judge is an
"inferior Officer," and also contend that the Chief Judge of the Tax
Court does not fall within any of the Constitution's three repositories of
the appointment power. The Court was not persuaded, and Justice
Blackmun explained that "[t]he roots of the separation-of-powers
concept embedded in the Appointments Clause are structural and
political. Our separation-of-powers jurisprudence generally focuses on
the danger of one branch's aggrandizing its power at the expense of
another branch. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382, 102
L. Ed. 2d 714, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). The Appointments Clause not
30501 U.S. 868 (1991).
31Id. at 877-78.
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only guards against this encroachment but also preserves another aspect
of the Constitution's structural integrity by preventing the diffusion of
the appointment power."32 The structural principles embodied in the
Appointments Clause do not speak only, or even primarily, of
Executive prerogatives simply because they are located in Article II.
According to the Court, this dynamic protects our liberty interest by
preventing the concentration of judicial appointment power.
The Appointments Clause prevents Congress from
dispensing power too freely; it limits the universe of
eligible recipients of the power to appoint. Because it
articulates a limiting principle, the Appointments Clause
does not always serve the Executive's interests. For
example, the Clause forbids Congress from granting the
appointment power to inappropriate members of the
Executive Branch.... The structural interests protected
by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one
branch of Government but of the entire Republic.3
There is thus a constitutional limitation imposed on the selection
of article III judges: the limitation restricts Congress and the President
from attempting to upset the balance of authority between the three
branches of government. Were the political branches of our federal
government to try to staff article III courts to further a political
ideology, for example, they would be confronted by an existing cadre
of more than 700 article-III judges who enjoy life tenure.34 They would
also have to mobilize a combination of political continuity, executive
determination, the absence of strong resistance in the Senate, and a
large number of vacancies.35 In contrast, one commentator has written,
"'Stacking' [an administrative] commission with a small number of
members who enjoy limited terms is considerably easier, especially at
its creation, when all seats are vacant."36 The political reality of our
32Id.
33Id. at 878.
34David J. Meltzer, 65 IND. L.J. 291,292 (1990).33Id.
36Id.
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position as members of the administrative bench is that we attain our
positions not through the process of constitutional appointment suffered
by our counterparts on the federal bench, but instead by virtue of a
delegation of both legislative and executive authority. We do not
generally enjoy the gift of unlimited time in office, but instead are in
many cases wholly dependent upon the good will of the executive
office we serve. We almost certainly do not enjoy constitutional
protection against the diminishment of our salaries.
New Deal Jurisprudence and the Administrative State
It is not by happenstance that ALJs reach the bench by means
other than constitutional appointment. In the evolution of the
administrative adjudicative forum, we have gotten to where we are
today because those who preceded us served a need that was different
than the need met by article III judges. Consider the genesis of what is
generally recognized as the first of our modem administrative agencies,
the Interstate Commerce Commission.37 The ICC was established by
Congress under the powers of Article I, and has as its enabling
authority the power to administer statutory schemds of federal
regulation. Characteristic of the administrative state, its authority was
over disputes involving public rights, and article III courts reviewed the
ICC's decisions on a de novo basis.38 In the formative years of the ICC,
the notion was that the administrative bench need have no direct
connection with article III courts, given that the scope of its authority
was limited to resolving public rights disputes arising from the
implementation of legislation. As one commentator noted, "the whole
point of the [traditional] 'public rights' analysis" has often been that
"no judicial involvement at all was required - executive determination
alone would suffice. 39
31See, e.g., S. Breyer and R. Stewart, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
PoLIcY, 26 (2d ed. 1985); B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 21 (2d ed. 1984); cited in Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., "Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III," 101 HARV.
L. REV. 916, 924 (1988).
38Fallon, supra note 38, at 924.
39 Peter L. Strauss, "The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch," 84 COLuM. L. REv. 573, 632 (1984), cited by Fallon, supra note 38, at
922.
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In considering our heritage as administrative law judges, we
should note that by the 1930s the administrative court was entrenched
and expanding, sharing much of the same apparent authority as that
possessed by article III courts, without the constitutional protection of
life tenure and undiminished salary. In the 1932 case cited as the
fountainhead of this trend, the Supreme Court upheld Congress'
decision to vest in an administrative adjudicator the responsibility for
deciding cases under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation. The Court in Crowell v. Benson4 ° assumed that public
rights disputes may not require a judicial decision at either the original
or appellate levels.4' Even in private rights cases, Crowell held, an
administrative tribunal may make findings of fact and render an initial
decision of legal and constitutional questions, as long as there is an
adequate review available in a constitutional court.42 In order for these
administrative adjudicators to be permitted to serve in a private rights
case, the Court required that the "essential attributes" of the judicial
decision must remain in an article III enforcement court, with the
administrative agency or other non-article III adjudicator functioning
less as an independent decision-maker than as an adjunct to the court.
The Court analogized the role of the agency to the traditional roles of
masters and commissioners. 4"
Thus, at the threshold of the New Deal, we see the Court's
ratification of the administrative bench, even in the exercise of judicial
authority over the private rights of citizens. This is true particularly
with regulatory agencies that restrict private activity and typically
possess the power to lay down rules, to determine whether private
parties have violated the law, and to prescribe sanctions." When we add
to this the welfare or entitlement agencies created to dispense public
funds through entitlement programs, we have what has become familiar
to us as the modem administrative state.45
40Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
4
'See id. at 50-51.
421d. at 51-65; cited in Fallon, supra note 38, at 924.
43See 285 U.S. at 51; cited in Fallon, supra note 38, at 924.
"Fallon, supra note 38, at 924.451d.
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Benefits of Executive Adjudications
The benefits from this evolution of the Fourth Branch are
tangible and significant. One commentator suggests four important
values that support permitting the use of non-article III tribunals in
place of constitutional courts:
The first value is an economic one: we have an interest
in making the best use of expertise to implement a
substantive regulatory agenda. Unlike article III judges,
who can perform only adjudicative functions, agencies
and legislative courts can apply their expertise not only
to adjudication but also to rule-making, administration,
and reporting to Congress and other decision makers.
Mixing adjudicative tasks with administrative and
rulemaking activities helps to adapt adjudication to the
implementation of regulatory powers in a way that
might not be possible within a scheme of strict
separation of powers.46
The second value is a pragmatic one: we have an interest in
attaining reasonable efficiency and order in the performance of basic
governmental functions. Consider the range of governmental functions
that one might argue should be brought to article III courts because they
arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States: these
include functions like those performed by the taxing, welfare, customs,
and immigration authorities. And then consider the nightmare that
bringing these cases would create if the administrative court were
removed.47
The third interest is one that hits at the heart of many of us, and
can be the source of serious concern. The establishment of non-article
III tribunals leads, by design, to a greater flexibility by the tribunal to
changing needs and political priorities. Congress and state legislatures
can experiment with the creation of ALJ positions, providing
"'Fallon, supra note 38, at 936.
47 Id.
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adjudicative reviews by persons lacking life tenure, and then as the
need arises can terminate the experiment - and fire the adjudicators-
without ever having created unremovable and underutilized article III
judge positions.4"
And finally, there is convincing support for the proposition that
nonjudicial proceedings can produce fairer and more consistent results
than those realized through ad hoc judicial determinations.
Commentators have noted, for example, that judicial determinations
about whether a person should be considered disabled for Social
Security purposes tend to be less consistent and equitable than
judgments based on bureaucratic rules that reflect statistical regularities
and likelihoods.49
Distinguishing the Executive Adjudicator from the Article III
Judge: The Appointment of the Jurist
These characteristics and benefits inure to both the state and the
federal administrative bench. Over time, they have been the impetus
for an entrenched and interwoven legal culture that looks to us and to
article III courts for assurance that the benefits of adjudication by non-
article III courts outweigh the costs associated with the loss of an
independent adjudicator. And thus we come to an area where we
should note the AL's role in society. The appointment of ALJs is
accomplished by a wide variety of vehicles, where some are selected
through organized applications like those used by the Office of
Personnel Management in the selection of Social Security ALJs; at the
other end of the spectrum, there are those holding the title of ALJ or
hearing examiner who are screened by the agency they serve, hired by
the agency, evaluated by the agency, subject to discipline by the
agency, and rewarded by the agency. This latter approach carries with
it the very real aura of dependence, not independence. As we have
heard in the past, the public looks at this captive ALJ and asks "how
can I expect to win this case when the [agency] is my accuser,
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prosecutor, and judge?"5 One commentator wrote that this statement
exemplifies the public perception of administrative law judges being
biased and partial to their employing agencies.
51
The Evolution of the Executive Adjudicator and the Central Panel
ALJ
The task before us, and the reason for considering the
differences between the judicial court and the legislative or executive
adjudicator, is that by considering the benefits and weighing the costs
of turning to the administrative bench, we can craft the best possible
vehicle for dispensing justice. My proposal for further discussion and
consideration is that the creation of the central panel of hearing officers
to serve the adjudicative needs of agencies at both the state and federal
level is the single most effective device to attain the maximum degree
of public benefit at the least level of public risk. By itself, this proposal
breaks no new ground; indeed, the resolution of the ABA in 1997
recommending that state and territorial legislatures enact the Model Act
Creating a State Central Hearing Agency brings the proposal to a
concrete and forward position. What my proposal brings to the fore,
rather, is the observation that there are significant differences between
the administrative adjudicator and the article III adjudicator,
particularly in terms of the accountability and the independence of the
adjudicator, that should be considered in the further evolution of the
administrative bench. The central panel proposal recognizes that the
administrative adjudicator is not cloaked with the accouterments of
independence attributed to article III judges, nor to judges of the
judicial branch generally. When properly implemented, the central
panel has the potential for accentuating the strengths of the
administrative bench, compensating for the absence of this measure of
independence, and in the process fostering credibility in the public
mind.
5 Judge Earl Thomas, "Administrative Law Judges: The Corps Issue," at 5 (A.B.A.
1987).
s' Id., cited in Karen S. Lewis, "Administrative Law Judges and the Code of Judicial
Conduct: A Need for Regulated Ethics," 94 DICK. L. REV. 929, fn. 2 and accompanying text
(1990).
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Chief Judge Felter52 described the significant differences
between traditional administrative law judicial systems and the central
panel system, in his Fellowship article in 1995:
Unlike decentralized Administrative Law Judges,
housed in the agencies they serve, independent central
panels are geared to one mission only - adjudication.
In a nutshell, the only business of a central panel of
Administrative Law Judges is to hear and decide cases
- not to occasionally serve as house counsel for an
agency or in other legal capacities. Not only do central
panels have a vested interest in being efficient and cost
effective, they must because they are under a
microscope focused on adjudications - to the exclusion
of other tasks.53
Thus, we note what is left behind when a traditional executive
judiciary turns to the central panel: members of the executive judiciary
end their part-time roles as legal counselor to the agency, and stop
serving as an employees of the agency. While the agency loses control
over the employment status of the ALJ, control remains with the
executive branch, only now channeled through the chief administrative
law judge. The change is a fundamental one, and is a key to
accomplishing the first goal stated in the Model Act: to "provide a
source of independent administrative law judges to preside in contested
cases" arising in the executive branch of government.54
Fundamentals of the Central Panel of Administrative Law Judges
Under the Model Act, the duties of the executive judiciary
2Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Chief Judge, State of Colorado Department of Administration,
Division of Administrative Hearings.3Edwin L. Felter, Jr., "1994 NAALJ Fellowship Paper: Administrative Adjudication
Total Quality Management: The Only Way to Reduce Costs and Delays Without Sacrificing
Due Process," 15 J.N.A.A.L.J. 5, 9 (1995).54Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency (Office of Administrative
Hearings), as unanimously adopted on February 3, 1997, by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association, reprinted at 17 J.N.A.A.L.J. 313-22 (1997) (hereinafter Model Act).
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remain with the executive branch, yet the executive judiciary is
expressly separated from the investigatory, prosecutory, and policy-
making functions of the executive branch agencies. " The independence
of each ALJ is assured first by the selection of the individual AL. The
Model Act offers three options for ALJ selection: by the Governor,
using the screening and recommendation of a judicial nominating
commission, by competitive examination in the classified service of
state employment, or by the chief administrative law judge. 6 Once
appointed, the ALJ becomes an employee of the central panel office
(the Office of Administrative Hearings, in the Model Act)." One option
also addresses exemptions for ALJs "grandfathered" by the conversion,
exempting those already serving as ALJs from the requirement that they
be licensed to practice law or that they have held such a license for five
years."
The role of the executive administrator (for example, the
department head, or the members of a licensing board) who
traditionally hears cases as an adjudicator may, or may not, change
under the Model Act. One option of the Model Act is to provide that
if the agency head or governing body "hears the case without delegation
or assignment to a hearing officer or administrative law judge," then the
central panel office would not hear the case, preserving the status quo.59
In all other cases, however, the Model Act provides for central panel
officers to "administer the resolution of all contested cases."6° There
may be times when such an appointment is not possible, for example,
when there are not sufficient qualified ALJs to serve. In such a case,
the chief administrative law judge shall designate "in writing an
individual to serve as an administrative law judge in a particular
proceeding before the agency" and may, under optional language, limit
candidates to those possessing the qualifications of service as an ALJ,
and may also subject the candidate to the Code of Judicial Conduct.6'
111d., § 1-2(a).
56Id.
"Model Act, § 1-2(b).
"Id.
"Model Act, § 1-3(a).
60Id.
6
'Model Act, § 1-8.
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Once a matter has been referred by an agency, one or more ALJs "shall
administer the resolution of the matters referred."62 As such, the agency
loses its role in administering resolutions once a referral is made.
Optional language is offered, however, whereby the agency may engage
in "appropriate interlocutory review" and may proceed to an
"appropriate termination or modification of the proceeding[J" 63 This
permits the agency to settle cases docketed with the central panel
adjudicator, apparently with or without the participation or approval of
the ALJ.
Ensuring Systemic Independence and Uniformity Under the
Central Panel
In a substantial change from the status quo, under the Model Act
the executive branch has a means by which executive adjudications
throughout the state systems can be directed by a single person. '
Selection of the chief administrative law judge is made either through
the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a definite
term of years; or through competitive examination in the classified
service of state employment.65 This is in contrast with traditional
approaches, where typically the Governor will appoint members of
boards and commissions, and once appointed those members determine
among themselves who shall direct the adjudicative efforts pursued by
the agency. Without a central panel, the result can be and often is a
patchwork of very different administrative approaches, amounting to a
confusing legal system that the executive branch may have no
reasonable means for organizing or monitoring. Worse, without a
central panel there is no reliable way to control costs nor achieve the
economies of scale that can be realized with a statewide, uniform
adjudicative process.
62Model Act, § 1-3(b).
63Model Act, § 1-10.
"Model Act, § 1-4.6Sld.
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Cost-Benefits of Making the Administrative Process More
Accessible
Where the status quo is susceptible to charges that it is
byzantine, inconsistent, and extremely inefficient, the alternative
proposed by the Model Act offers the potential to create uniform, cost-
effective procedures that laymen and lawyers alike can understand and
utilize. Chief Judge Felter reported on the results achieved in Colorado,
after that state implemented a central panel in 1976:
In 1980, in-house statistical research revealed that the
central panel was able to handle workers' compensation
cases at approximately $1.50 per case less than the
Division of Labor's referees had done prior to the 1976
consolidation. In fiscal year 1992/93, 17 ALJs (14.95
FTEs), statewide, through Denver and four regional
offices, handled 12,811 cases for a cost of
approximately $2.1 million. This equals a total cost of
$163.92 per case ranging from a typical one hour
workers' compensation hearing to a three week-long
medical board hearing.66
Studies like those from Colorado, and others from California,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Tennessee, 67 which
preceded the development of the Model Act, have been supplemented
with studies from the early 1990s, including reviews of central panels
in Maryland, Texas, California, North Dakota, New Jersey, Tennessee,
Wisconsin, Washington, Minnesota, Colorado, North Carolina, Florida,
Iowa, Missouri, and Virginia.68
"Felter, supra note 54, at 8.
6
'Malcolm Rich, "Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States," 65
JuDICATURE 246 (1981) (evaluating central panel states using legislation that preceded the
Model Act); see also Duane R. Harves, "Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient
and Effective: How the AU Central Panel System Works in Minnesota," 65 JUDICATURE 257
(1981). 6
"Allen Hoberg, "Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s," 14
J.N.A.A.L.J. 107 (1994).
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The Effect of a Central Panel on the Appearance of Impartiality
and Independence
The Model Act creates the reality, not just the impression, of
judicial independence in the executive judiciary. It does so first by
protecting tenure of the chief administrative law judge by limiting the
governor's power of removal to instances of "good cause following
notice, and an opportunity for an adjudicative hearing... ."69 This is
true whether the chief administrative law judge is appointed by the
Governor or through competitive examination. 70
Under the Model Act, the rank and file ALJ is assured
independence by the provision that subjects the ALJ to the
"requirements and protections of' the applicable state classified
service.7' Removal, suspension, demotion "or adverse actions
including, any action that might later influence a reduction in force"
must be founded on circumstances constituting good cause, and can be
imposed only after notice and an opportunity to be heard in an APA
type of hearing before an impartial hearing officer.7" In addition, the
Model Act protects the ALJ from layoffs, linking any such layoffs to
those permitted "in accordance with established, objective civil service
or merit system procedures[.]"73 Protection for the salaries of the ALJ
is found in the requirement that the ALJ receive compensation
"provided in the State budget."'74 In one alternative under the Model
Act, the AL's compensation is to be "salary in the same amount as that
provided for" a comparable court judge.75 In reality, experience has
shown that this parity has generally not been achieved, and the salaries
of ALJs are more often than not substantially less than those secured by
statutory and constitutionally created judgeships.76 Recognizing that
9Model Act, § 1-4(a).70Id.
71Model Act, § 1-6(a)(3).
"Model Act, § 1-6(a)(3) and (a)(4).
7'Model Act, § 1-6(a)(5).
74Model Act, § 1-6(a)(6).
75Id.
76See, Survey of Administrative Law Judge Salaries as of January 1, 1997, Nat'l
Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges News, March 1998.
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true parity in compensation among judges of the two branches of
government is an appropriate aspiration but by no means a reality, the
Model Act appears to get as close as possible to offering ALJs the two
lynchpins of judicial independence: tenure in office, and an
uninterrupted salary.
Beyond these two general protections, there is a third, explicit
provision that guards against overreaching by the agency, where it
states that an ALJ "shall not be responsible to or subject to the
supervision, direction or direct or indirect influence of an officer,
employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigator,
prosecutory, or advisory functions for an agency."77 The Model Act
thus draws a very real line between the adjudicator and the executive
agency, severing the chain of command between the adjudicator and the
agency served by the adjudicative process. In creating this schism, the
Model Act deliberately weakens the executive agency's control over the
agency adjudicator. The control is not eliminated, nor is there a net loss
in control available to the executive branch; rather, control over the
adjudicative process is taken from the agency, where it resides in a
decentralized, possibly parochial form, and concentrates the control in
a central adjudicative authority within the executive branch. This
centralization reflects an evolution of the administrative adjudicative
forum, providing a remedy to one of the more substantial shortcomings
of the APA and FAPA.
The Further Evolution of the ALJ Under the Restrictions of the
Central Panel
There is a series of provisions mandating what amounts to a
quidpro quo from those accepting work in a central panel office. In
exchange for the protection of tenure through the civil service, the
Model Act requires the central panel ALJ to commit all of his or her
professional time to the task: full time service is required, and the
private practice of law is prohibited, although there is optional language
that would permit the ALJ to practice law if serving the central office
77Model Act, § 1-6(b).
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as a part-time AL. 78 Unlike the status quo, candidates for new
positions as ALJs must be licensed to practice law, although there is
optional language exempting from this requirement all non-lawyer
hearing officers and administrative law judges who are already
employed when the central panel is created.79 There is optional
language that adds to the juris doctorate requirement the further
requirements that the license be issued by the state in which the office
is located, and that the ALJ have a minimum of five years' admittance
to the bar. ° There also is broad language barring the ALJ from
performing "duties inconsistent with the duties and responsibilities of
an administrative law judge,"'" and there are two important express
provisions concerning control over the ALJ: First, the ALJ shall be
"subject to administrative supervision by the chief administrative law
judge;"' 2 and second, the ALJ shall be "subject to the code of conduct
for administrative law judges."s3
Restrictions on the CEO: How the Chief ALJ Creates a Fair
Tribunal
Independence in the administration of the central office is
further ensured by providing the chief administrative law judge with an
explicit statutory mandate to "protect and ensure the decisional
independence of each administrative law judge."8 4 The chief ALJ (like
all ALJs) must take an oath of office,85 and the chief ALJ must be an
attorney admitted to practice in the State for a minimum of five years.8 6
The chief ALJ takes the appointment as a full-time position, and is
barred from engaging in the private practice of law. 7 Also like all
ALJs, the chief ALJ is subject to the code of conduct for administrative
7SModel Act, § 1-6(a)(8).
"
9Model Act, § 1-2(b).
"'Model Act, § 1-6(a)(2).
"Model Act, § 1-6(a)(7).
"Model Act, § 1-6(a)(9).
"'Model Act, § l-6(a)(1 0).
4Model Act, § 1-5(a)(4).
'Model Act, §§ 1-4(b)(1), 1-6(a)(1).
"Model Act, § 1-4(b)(5).
"7Model Act, § 1-4(b)(2).
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law judges, 8 although at the outset it may be that no such code exists,
or if it does exist it will have been promulgated by the chief ALJ in the
early years of the central panel's existence.
To accomplish the administrative task of running the central
hearing office, the chief ALJ is given authority to supervise the office, 9
and employ staff "in accordance with the State budget."9 The Model
Act provides two alternatives for staffing the office: under one option,
the chief ALJ shall "appoint and remove administrative law judges in
accordance with" the Act; in another option the Governor appoints the
ALJs "through a judicial nominating commission" provided for under
one option of the Act.9 In perhaps the most significant provision of the
Chief's authority, the Chief ALJ is given the power to "assign
administrative law judges in any case referred to the Office."92 When
paired with the mandate to "protect and ensure the decisional
independence of each administrative law judge,"'93 the Model Act takes
a quantum leap towards creating an executive judiciary that offers all
participants a hearing that is both fair in appearance and fair in reality.
The heretofore frustrated litigant who in the past would have to make
his case to an in-house agency lawyer will now be able to appear before
a lawyer trained in the business of agency adjudications, yet not
financially beholding to the agency. The adjudicator will not have been
chosen by the agency, but instead by a chief administrative law judge
who answers only to the governor and who can be removed only for
cause publicly shown.
Quality Control and Adjudicative Management Under the Central
Panel
Given the mandate that the executive judiciary be both fair and
efficient, the Model Act offers at least a framework for creating an
efficient administrative judiciary. The chief ALJ is expressly required
"Model Act, § 1-4(b)(7).
"gModel Act, § 1-5(a)(1).
l'Model Act, § 1-4(c).
91Model Act, § 1-5(a)(2).
92Model Act, § 1-5(a)(3).
93Model Act, § 1-5(a)(4).
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to "establish and implement standards" for ALJs, as well as specialized
training programs and materials for ALJs.94 Optional language refines
this, by providing that the Chief ALJ "establish qualifications for the
selection of administrative law judges."95  The chief ALJ is also
authorized, in one option, to "create specialized subject matter divisions
within the Office."9 6 The Chief ALJ is also directed to "adopt a code
of conduct for administrative law judges.97 In a provision that some
ALJs may find chilling (perhaps even threatening to their own version
of decisional independence), the Model Act also requires that the chief
AU "monitor the quality of state administrative hearings through the
provision of training, observation, feedback, and, when necessary,
discipline of A.L.J.s who do not meet appropriate standards of conduct
and competence, subject to the provisions of Section 1-6(a)(4)[.]" The
rank and file should, however, take heart in the express mandate that
the chief AU "provide and coordinate continuing education programs
and services for administrative lawjudges, including research, technical
assistance, technical and professional publications" and should
"compile and disseminate information, and advise of changes in the law
relative to their duties[.]" 99
Cost Effective Adjudications
As with any effort to attain economies of scale in the public
sector, the operations of the central panel must be open to fiscal review,
and the Model Act provides for this through mandatory disclosure to
the Governor through an annual report by the chief ALJ (and with
optional language calling for a report to the Legislature as well). 00 In
addition, the Model Act mandates that the Central Office will be subject
to audit by the same legislative audit office and under the same rules
and rotation by which other State agencies are audited.' The Model
94Model Act, § 1-5(a)(5).
95Model Act, § 1-5(b)(2).
'Model Act, § I-5(b)(5).
97Model Act, § 1-5(a)(8).
9 Model Act, § 1-5(a)(9).
"Model Act, § 1-5(a)(6).
"°°Model Act, § 1-5(a)(10).
'Model Act, § 1-7(b).
Spring 1998 Comparison Between Judicial Branch and Executive Branch Judges 27
Act anticipates that agencies other than those required to use the central
panel cadre will want to do so, and to this end expressly authorizes the
practice. 0 2 Anticipating the opposite reaction may also arise, the
Model Act mandates that all agencies of State government "shall
cooperate with the chief administrative law judge in the discharge of the
duties of the Office."' 0
3
Limits on Agency Control Over the Adjudicative Process Under the
Central Panel
With one exception, the agency is not permitted to select a
particular ALJ' 4 Agencies may have a role in selecting an ALJ "in
arbitration or similar proceedings as provided by law or in this subtitle
or in regulations adopted under this subtitle[.] ' 5 Once the chief ALJ
has assigned an ALJ to a hearing, the agency may not reject the chosen
ALJ for a particular proceeding."° It should be noted, however, that the
Model Act expressly exempts all agencies of the Legislative Branch of
the State government, all agencies of the Judicial Branch of the State
Government, and the Governor's office itself, and provides language
which may be used to exempt any number of other state agencies, as
politics deems expedient."0 7 Presumably one of the first acts of the
chief ALJ would be to craft procedures that can be followed when a
selected ALJ is challenged by the agency or a party as being
unqualified due to conflict of interest or other substantive basis.
A uniform approach to administrative hearings increases
efficiency and reduces the time it takes to understand the administrative
process. The Model Act begins the process of creating a uniform
approach by vesting in the ALJ certain powers. Included in a list of
codified powers is the authority to issue subpoenas, administer oaths,
control the course of the proceedings, engage in or encourage the use
of alternative methods of resolving disputes, and the statutory authority
'°
2Model Act, § 1-5(b)(3) - (b)(5).
'°
3Model Act, § 1-7(a).
'"Model Act, § 1-7(c).
1"5id.
'
0 O6Id..
"'TModel Act, § l-l(a).
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to direct the payment of "reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad faith actions or tactics
that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay."' ' In
a world where contempt sanctions are rare, a properly utilized
attorneys-fees statute may do more to "judicialize" agency proceedings
than any other single innovation.
Practical Realities: The Issue of Turf
Agencies may be inclined to resist the Model Act, in large part
because those in the agencies may fear the loss of control over the
outcome of adjudicative hearings. The fear may be well-founded, for
if the agency presently controls the outcome, it does indeed stand to
lose that measure of control, and appropriately so. Nonetheless, under
the Model Act the agency is not in all cases required to abide by the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or recommendation of the ALJ,
unless such a provision exists elsewhere in the law. There are four
possible uses of reports once rendered by the ALJ. Under one option,
the assigned ALJ "shall render the final decision of the agency not
subject to agency review," unless expressly exempted in the statute. 109
In other cases, and except as provided by law, the ALJ will issue a
decision that could be a "proposed," "initial," or "recommended"
decision depending on the adjective used in the legislation "unless the
agency authorizes the issuance of a final decision, as provided in the
Administrative Procedure Act.""0 Nonetheless, the agency is not free
to manipulate the report to suit itself: When the proposed decision or
order arrives at the agency, the agency "shall not modify, reverse or
remand the proposed decision of the administrative law judge except
for specified reasons in accordance with law." '' Judicial review of
agency decisions procured under the Model Act occurs in the manner
prescribed in the status quo, whether by the provisions of the APA or
any other specific statutory provision."2
'Model Act, §§ 1-9(1) through 1-9(6).
"°Model Act, § 1-10(a).
"'Model Act, § 1-10(b).
"'Model Act, § 1-11.
12Id.
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In some instances, there will be reason to consider establishing
a panel to advise the chief AL. The reasons for creating such a panel
may be political, they may be fiscal, or may come from other sources,
but the Model Act anticipates that some formal oversight will take
place as the central panel replaces the existing patchwork of the
executive judiciary. In optional language, the Model Act offers a
framework for such an oversight commission, designated in the Model
Act as the "advisory council on administrative hearings," drawn from
the public and private sector, with representatives from the senate, the
house, the attorney general's office, agency designees, the general
public, and the state bar association, with the governor choosing all but
the legislative representatives and the representative from the attorney
general's office." 3 The essential powers and duties of the council
would be to advise the chief ALJ in carrying out the duties of the
Office; identify issues of importance to ALJs that the chief ALJ should
address; review issues and procedures relating to administrative
hearings and the administrative process; review and comment upon
rules of procedure and other regulations and policies proposed by the
chief ALJ; review and comment on the chief AL's annual report; and
study exempted agencies to recommend which exemptions should be
continued. "14
Why the Administrative Tribunal Will Prevail - Without an
Independent Adjudicator
The innovations built into the Model Act offer a tangible and
workable bridge between the credibility gap separating the article III
judge and the administrative law judge. It is true that the ALJ is not
wholly independent of the executive branch; such independence is
reserved for article III judges, and would not be consistent with the
fundamental character of the administrative adjudicative forum. A
greater degree of independence comes, however, from the barrier a
central panel erects that insulates the ALJ from threats to pay and
tenure by the agency. Instead of reporting to the agency, the ALJ will
report to and be evaluated by the central panel chief administrative
I 3Model Act, § 1-12.
114Model Act, § 1-14.
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judge. Once a matter is brought under the authority of the central panel,
the agency's role is solely that of a party litigant, until the issuance of
the final report. The Model Act does not prohibit agency review of an
AL's report and recommendation, and indeed continues the common
procedure whereby the AU issues a proposed decision, which the
agency head shall not modify, reverse or remand except for specified
reasons in accordance with law. As such, the agency continues to have
a role in implementing policy through adjudications: it can reach factual
as well as legal conclusions that are contrary to those articulated by the
ALJ, but it must do so using the report as a starting point, and when it
does so its rationale must be in accordance with law.
Limitations of the Agency Adjudicator and the Central Panel: Why
the Agency Adjudicator is Different
The risks inherent in over reliance on the administrative bench
should not be overlooked. There is a tangible distinction to be made
between the role of judges of the administrative adjudicative forum and
judges of the judicial branch. Noteworthy in this list is the absence in
the agency adjudicative forum of a truly independent adjudicator. By
constitutional and statutory design, the executive adjudicator is not
truly independent; he or she answers to the chief executive of the
governing body, be it the President, governor, or mayor." 5 The article
III judge, and to a lesser extent the judicial branch judge whose position
is a creature of statute, by definition does not answer to the chief
executive officer. Replacing the article III judge with an agency
adjudicator results in a tangible loss of independence, for the agency
adjudicator, even under the central panel model, is not wholly insulated
from pressure from the executive branch. While they doubtlessly face
pressure from other sources, article III judges and judges whose
positions are constitutionally created do not have to answer directly to
the chief executive officer.
I5See Antonin Scalia, "Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,"
1989 DuKE L.J. 511 (1989) (probing the true limits of the separation of powers doctrine with
respect o judicial review of agency action).
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Article III Courts and the Balance of Constitutional Power
One writer offers this description of the nature of the key checks
and balances that are written into our Constitutional structure:
The framers of the Constitutional aimed to create a
government capable of vigorous and effective action.
Yet they also feared the arbitrariness and tyranny that
could result from excessive concentration of power in a
single branch. Believing that the best safeguard against
administrative capriciousness and oppression lay in a
structure in which the factional or self-aggrandizing
impulses of one branch could be checked by another,
the framers viewed article III's provision of a life-
tenured federal judiciary as crucial to the separation of
powers. To subject federal judges to political influence
by Congress or the national executive would, in their
view, have threatened the rule of law." ' 16
This ideal, clearly limited to the article III court, may yet be
threatened, if recent political trends continue. A case strongly in point
arose during the last presidential campaign, with candidates from both
the Democratic and Republican parties making campaign issues
attacking the unpopular decisions of selected members of the federal
judiciary.1 7 Such attacks prompted the report of the American Bar
Association's Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence, which was reported on during the ABA's annual
meeting in 1997. In that report, the Commission made a series of very
specific recommendations aimed at preserving the separation of powers
between the judiciary, the Congress, and the President. One
noteworthy recommendation was that legislation should be enacted to
exclude budgetary items involving the federal judiciary's
16Fallon, supra note 38, at 937.
" See Francis J. Larkin, "The Variousness, Virulence, and Variety of Threats to
Judicial Independence," 36 JUDGES' J. 4 (1997).
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appropriations from the presidential line-item veto."' My suggestion
here is that the administrative branch can preempt similar attacks by
aligning towards the central panel model.
Administrative Courts: An Inferior Mandate
A second threat linked to the overuse of the administrative
forum involves fairness to litigants. "Especially when a citizen
advances a claim against the government or asserts an unpopular
position, the life tenure and salary guarantees of article III provide a
nontrivial safeguard of adjudicative fairness. An official who is
dependent on Congress or the executive for continuation in office may
be, or may appear to be, less impartial than a judge whose continued
tenure is assured."' 9 Article III's mandate does not, however, extend
to state court judges, nor to the administrative adjudicator; as the Court
held in Palmore v. United States,' the right to an adjudicator having
the twin protections of tenure and salary guarantees is one that arises
only if a case is litigated before an article III tribunal.' 2' Under
Palmore it is clear that the fairness norms of due process are not
offended when the state court judge lacks life tenure. There is an
inferior mandate under the due process clause attaching to the non-
article III adjudicative forum, one that is met whenever the state court
or administrative proceeding is unbiased and affords reasonable
procedures. 122
Is the Agency Adjudicator Independent or Impartial, and Does it
Make a Difference Under the Due Process Clause
It should come as no surprise that the agency adjudicative forum
does not require a wholly independent adjudicator. Absent any state
statutory or constitutional provision giving greater protection than the
federal constitution, the independence required of agency adjudicators
"'See "Executive Summary: An Independent Judiciary," Report of the ABA
Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, July 4, 1997, at 12.
19Fallon, supra note 38, at 940.
'
20Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
"I Id. at 410; See Fallon, supra note 38, at 940.
12 Fallon, supra note 38, at 940.
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under the federal constitution flows first and foremost from the due
process clause. Instead of the protections flowing from lifetime tenure
and guaranteed salary, due process requires only that there be a
balancing of the individual's interest in fair and accurate results against
the governmental interest in efficient and expedient decision making,
as the Court explains in Mathews v. Eldridge. 2 3 This is an inferior
mandate because it offers no assurance that those confronting the
tribunal will receive the services of an independent adjudicator."
Indeed, agency adjudicators may be employees of the agency,
supervised by the agency, and subject to discipline by the agency
without necessarily tainting the process.
In Schweiker v. McClure'2 the Court held that persons acting as
ALJs must be "impartial" in their adjudications, but it began its analysis
by restating the doctrine that the officers are entitled to a presumption
that they were unbiased. 26 The Supreme Court rejected the lower
court's analysis that had found the links between adjudicator and the
agency "were sufficient to create a constitutionally impermissible risk
of hearing officer bias against the claimants." 27  The Court also
rejected analogies drawn by the District Court between the standards
applicable to agency adjudicators and standards applicable to those
courts that are subject to the judicial canons. 21
State courts, too, have been faced with constitutional challenges
against agency adjudicators employed by the agencies being served. In
Oregon, the court in Matthew v. Juras129 considered the complaint that
claims on behalf of people seeking disability benefits were being
administratively adjudicated by employees of the agency responsible for
administering the benefits program. Citing to both Morrissey v.
123Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-34 (1976); see also, Fallon, supra note
38, at 942.
"uSee Christopher B. McNeil, "Due Process and the Ohio Administrative Procedure
Act: The Central Panel Proposal," 23 OHiO NORTHERN UNIV. L. REV. 783, 798-803 (1997).
'5"Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
126Id. at 195 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
'Id. at 193 (quoting from McClure v. Harris, 502 F. Supp. 409, 414 (N.D. Cal.
1980)).
28Id. at 197, n.11.
'"latthew v. Juras, 519 P.2d 402 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).
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Brewer130 and Goldberg v. Kelley, 3' the court rejected the challenge.
Noting that under Goldberg the hearing officer need be neither neutral
nor detached, the court found that all the due process clause required is
that "the hearing be conducted by some person other than the one
initially dealing with the case."'132
The Role of the Impartial Agency Hearing Examiner
The court in Matthew also draws from Dean Davis, who wrote:
The status of the examiner should and does depend on
his functions. His two main functions are to preside and
to prepare initial or recommended decisions. Both
functions are definitely subordinate. . . . The
examiner's role as a deciding officer is overshadowed
by the power of the agency. That the examiner's initial
decision may become the final decision of the agency if
no party appeals and if the agency does not of its own
motion call up the case does not mean that the examiner
has significant power, for the power is in substance only
one of recommending .... The key provision of the
APA concerning the deciding function of the examiner
is that "the agency... shall have all the powers which it
would have in making the initial decision." . . . . To
exalt the examiner to a position equal to or above that of
the agency and to make him altogether independent of
the agency would be clearly incompatible with the
agency's continued responsibility.'
The implications of this subordination are significant in this
analysis of the distinctions between judicial courts and administrative
adjudicative tribunals. It would be unfounded, for example, to suggest
that the level of independence appropriate for article III judges is also
'
30Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
"'Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
'
32Matthew, 519 P.2d at 407.
1331d. at 407, quoting Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 224-27 (2nd ed. 1972).
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appropriate for the ALJ. The ALJ serves an executive function not
shared by the article III judge: her authority is no greater than that of
the agency she serves, and as an adjudicator she is charged with an
affirmative ethical obligation to perform judicial or quasi-judicial tasks
in the context of the executive agency's mandate, not independent of
that agency, for she has no authority independent of that agency. There
is a symbiotic relationship between the ALJ and the agency not present
in courts of general jurisdiction, a relationship that must be
acknowledged in any discussion of the quest for ALJ decisional
independence. Due process under the Constitution is not threatened by
this relationship, and does not require independence of the ALJ from
the agency being served. At best, due process requires a minimal
degree of neutrality by the adjudicator.1 34 The central panel meets that
challenge, but goes beyond it, offering a tangible layer of protection
against agency overreaching, and (it is hoped) offering evidence, if not
proof, that the state is committed to providing participants with a fair
hearing before a fair tribunal.
How the Central Panel Can Ensure the Public Perception of
Fairness
We can and should commit some of our energy to addressing
the public concerns about fairness and the appearance of fairness in
these administrative tribunals. I submit that the central panel format
now adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association in the Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency,
offers the greatest potential for meeting the expectations of those served
by the administrative branch.
With half a century of development to consult, states have
available a record reflecting steady and successful evolution of the
administrative judicial forum.'35 From California's generally positive
'
34Kenneth Culp Davis, "ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE," 3rd Ed. (1978)
(describing state and local administrative law, separation of powers, and reasons arguing for
and against agency independence, sections 1:10, 2:8-9).
'See Malcolm C. Rich and Wayne E. Brucar, "The Central Panel System for
Administrative Law Judges: A Survey of Seven States (1983)," Governor's Comm. on the Off.
of Admin. L., State of N.J., 1984 Rep. (providing a survey, now a mid-point in the
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initial foray into the administrative state, 136 to more recent
developments in Delaware, Texas, Tennessee, and eighteen other states
that have opted for central panel adjudicators, we now know much
about how the public perceives administrative adjudications, and we
have a substantial body of common law from which we may draw
conclusions about what works and what does not work in administrative
adjudicatory systems. 137 Agency adjudications are the result of a
sharing of power between the executive branch and the legislative
branch. 138 This sharing brings with it a tension that requires the
participants to be mindful of policies and the public perception of
fairness in the process.
Over time, changes have been made consistent with the public's
interest in having a fair day in court. Under the direction of the
Supreme Court, agency adjudications must afford rights closely linked
to those arising when litigants are in Article Ill-type courts, like the
right to cross examination, the right to notice of the charges upon which
action is proposed, the right to compel the attendance of witnesses, and
the right to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner. 139 The process of selecting administrative law judges, too, has
evolved, with in-house agency adjudicators now being replaced by
independent hearing examiners from central panels in those states that
have moved to the central panel model. 40 The quality of those
development of central panel jurisprudence).
"
6Michael Asmiow, "New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication
Fundamentals," Eighth Annual Central Panel Directors' Conference, 1991 (surveying the
migration of states to the central panel).
137See Thomas, supra note 51 (reviewing a proposal to centralize the federal
government's employment of administrative law judges).
3
'See Merritt Ruhlen, "Manual for Administrative Law Judges," 1974
(Administrative Conference of the United States) (describing structure of administrative
hearings at the federal level, noting the powers and limitations of ALJs in the federal scheme);
George B. Shepherd, "Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics," 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557 (1996) (describing the genesis of the separation
of powers within the administrative forum, from an historical perspective).
'
39Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1984).
"4See L. Harold Levinson, "The Central Panel System: A Framework That Separates
ALJs from Administrative Agencies," 65 JUDICATURE 236 (1981) (describing the early stages
of the central panel, and its precursors); Allen Hoberg, "Administrative Hearings: State Central
Panels in the 1990s," 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 75 (1994).
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responsible for adjudications has likewise evolved, with states adopting
methods for appointing adjudicators that guard against cronyism, and
further by creating codes of judicial conduct that are appropriate for the
administrative forum. 4'
The Constitutional Judiciary and its Evolution and Devolution
In contrast, the constitutionally-created judiciary has a legacy
of at least two hundred years, and a lesser lineage for state
constitutional courts. This legacy teaches much about what makes
courts effective, but also warns of the dangers inherent in systems
subjected to political gridlock and the immobility that comes with a
constitutionally created adjudicative forum. Unlike the administrative
court, Article Ill-type courts draw their power directly from sovereign
constitutions. These courts are the preeminent source of adjudicative
power, and with that plenary grant of authority comes a measure of
diffidence that historically has, by design, not been subject to the
democratic urges of the governed, and instead has reflected our nation's
heritage that requires courts to honor the rule of law, rather than the
popular vote.
Professionalism in the Article III-type judiciary, like that of the
administrative law judiciary, is ensured by codes ojudicial conduct,
peer review, continuing education requirements and the like.'42
Increasingly, however, the public has begun to react, and usually
negatively, by threatening these courts with sanctions should there be
an outcome based on law but unpopular with the general public. The
insulation protecting the independence of the judiciary is, in certain
"'See Peter L. Strauss, "An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United
States," 1989 (Carolina Academic Press) (discussing state administrative law under American
federalism, and the history of the model state administrative procedure act promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, p. 187-90, and non-judicial
controls over government action, including "open government" regulations).
"
2See Karen S. Lewis, "Administrative Law Judges and the Code of Judicial
Conduct: A Need for Regulated Ethics," 94 DICK. L. REV. 929 (1990) (describing limitations
in the linkage between ethical standards of Article III-type judges and ALJs).
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widely publicized cases, eroding or at least being threatened.
The selection of Article III-type judges, either through popular
elections like those for courts of general jurisdiction in Ohio, or through
a process akin to the modified Missouri plan, is one of the key measures
for maintaining an independent judiciary, but the politicization of this
process, and the high cost of running for judicial office, may be taking
a toll on the perception that courts are run by those committed to a fair
hearing before an unbiased tribunal.
The modem administrative state has learned much from Article
III-type courts: both have created standards for professional conduct
and professional development (in the form of codes of judicial
responsibility and continuing education requirements), both benefit
from (and sometimes suffer from) oversight by the legislative branch
of government, and both are now the subject of direct public attention
and probing into the cost-effectiveness of their services. As between
the two types of courts, administrative adjudicative forums have a
closer link to lawmakers and the executive branch. That nexus - and
the political pressure that comes with such a link - has the beneficial
effect of keeping the administrative adjudicator in touch with public
policy. Article III-type courts acknowledge this, and in turn protect this
relationship by giving due deference to the interpretations of law
offered by the administrative adjudicator.
Freed from this direct legislative or executive oversight over its
operations, the Article Ill-type court has had less incentive to concern
itself with the "vox populi" with the result that the public at times reacts
with disappointment and distrust when reviewing trials of great public
interest. Pragmatically viewed, both types of courts have constituents
and budgets, and both need the support of the former to ensure the
sufficiency of the latter. To the extent each can adapt to changing
technology and the changing demands for adjudicative services, each
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will thrive and continue to be in a position to do justice. 43
As between the two, administrative adjudicators are more likely
to be able to make the changes needed to keep pace with the society's
demands, and to make them in time so as to evoke in the public a sense
of confidence. 44  The historical links between the executive and
legislative branches, tying both to the administrative resolution of
disputes, creates an empathy not always found in the relationships
between constitutional courts and lawmakers.
Recent technological innovations and public expositions suggest
the calcification of Article III-type courts and further suggest a growing
mistrust for that forum (both at the state and federal levels), where
"Court TV," gavel to gavel televised coverage of major trials, and
spontaneous dissections of court events for mass media consumption
threaten the public's perception that the judicial adjudicator can
produce a fair trial. In the wake of Daubert, 145 further, it appears Article
III-type courts are finding real difficulty in adjusting to the role of
gatekeepers of the process of gathering and assimilating technological
innovation in an increasingly complex technological world. 1
46
'41See Charles Gardner Geyh, "Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the
Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress," 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1996) (describing how
Congress and the judiciary are developing a new, interactive paradigm replacing traditional
separation of powers, suggesting that this interaction is a natural and superior part of our
administration of justice, and suggesting an interdisciplinary commission much like that
suggested by the new Model Central Panel commission prototype); but see Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
"APA Adjudication: Is the Questfor Uniformity Faltering?" 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65 (1996)
(describing the federal efforts to judicialize the administrative bench).
144See e.g., Senator Charles E. Grassley and Charles Pou, Jr., "Congress, the
Executive Branch and the Dispute Resolution Process," 1992 J. DIsP. RESOL. 1 (1992)
(describing the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and other agency dispute resolution
innovations).
'
4
'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
'16Peter L. Strauss, "Changing Times: The APA at Fifty," 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389
(1996) (discussing the impact of advanced technology in the article III court and the
administrative forum).
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Article Ill-type courts are adjusting: they are armed with tools
like Fed. Evid. Rule 706, which allows courts to retain the assistance of
technical experts hired not by the parties, but by the courts, to assist the
trier of fact in making the difficult determinations needed in technically
complex cases. But Article III-type courts are also victims of their own
success: implementing innovative programs like TQM and other quality
control measures is unlikely, and there are but few tools available to
urge courts to take costs into account when those courts try to keep up
with modem demands on their limited resources.
The Advantages of the Executive Adjudicative Forum
In contrast, the executive adjudicator, benefitting from expertise
in the technical areas of limited jurisdictions and able to operate in an
environment freed from expensive and time-consuming pre-trial
discovery burdens, has proved to both be effective and be publicly
perceived as being fair and efficient.'47 This result is not one arising
from serendipity, but is one natural result from operating in a forum
that was deliberately created to meet the needs of citizens whose
interests were to be balanced against the operations of government at
the state and local levels. 48
In contrast to the experience of Article-III type courts,
administrative forums have had a measure of success in applying
proven management tools to enhance the quality of adjudicative output.
Total Quality Management (TQM), performance evaluations, and other
well-established management tools are available and have been put into
141See Karen Y. Kauper, "Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law
Judges: A Model Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute," 18 U. MIca. J.L. REv. 537 (1985)
(detailing problems that led to the early evolution of the central panel).
141See William B. Swent, "South Carolina's ALJ: Central Panel, Administrative
Court, or a Little of Both?" 48 S.C. L. REV. 1 (1996) (making the distinction between the role
of an administrative court and an ALI hearing, surveying the evolution of administrative law
with respect to central panel development).
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place in administrative bodies. 149 Here again the contrast between the
executive adjudicator and the article III adjudicator is readily apparent,
particularly with respect to the use of increased oversight and
evaluations in an effort to improve AU productivity and efficiency. 50
In her recent article on the subject, Judge Young describes the paradox:
Most significantly, whereas in the judicial branch
evaluations of judges are commonly done through bar
surveys and/or by specially appointed commissions, in
the administrative law arena, although some
jurisdictions use survey instruments to obtain feedback
from the bar and other interested parties, when
performance evaluation of administrative law judges is
considered or undertaken, the model is often that of a
supervisor evaluating a subordinate employee in a
traditional management-by-objectives context, or at
least contains aspects of such a process. Such a model
would no doubt be considered anathema in the judicial
branch, comparable to the impropriety of a superior
judge attempting on an ex parte basis to influence
another judge with regard to issues in pending or
impending cases."'
The Continuing Debate on the Management of AJLs
Judge Young thus sets out some terms of the debate: ALJs are
evaluated using management tools which would be rejected by
members of the third branch judiciary. To call into question the wsdom
49See Edwin L. Felter, Jr., 1994 National Association of Administrative Law Judges
Fellowship Paper, "Administrative Adjudication Total Quality Management: The Only Way
to Reduce Costs and Delays Without Sacrificing Due Process," XV J. NAALJ 1 (1995)
(examining
cost/benefit-based innovations to which the APA-type adjudicatory schemes are amenable).
'5°See Young, supra note 7, at 5.
...Id., at 17 (footnotes omitted).
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wisdom of using such management tools, Judge Young identifies as
"[o]ne of the central tenets of our legal system ... the due process
concept that decision-makers must be independent, in order that they
can be neutral and ir-ipartial in their decisions."'12  This premise,
however, appears to draw from sources other than our administrative
law jurisprudence. Our cases tell us that as ALJs we must be impartial,
but there is no due process requirement that we be independent of the
agencies we serve. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has rejected the
conclusion that a pecuniary dependence between ALJ and agency
carries with it any aura of a deprivation of constitutional rights. In
Schweiker v. McClure'53 the hearing officers were former or current
employees of the agent acting in behalf of the agency, and their charge
was to conduct review determinations on behalf of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. The Court found no evidence to support
the complainant's "assertion that, for reasons of psychology,
institutional loyalty, or carrier coercion, hearing officers would be
reluctant to differ with carrier determinations. Such assertions require
substantiation before they can provide a foundation for invalidating an
Act of Congress."' 54 Judge Young draws from the words of Justice
Breyer, when he discusses "[t]he question ofjudicial independence [as]
revolv[ing] around the theme of how to assure judges decide according
to the law, rather than to their whims or to the will of the political
branches of government.""' This may tend to blur the lines of this
discussion, for Justice Breyer was addressing the role of article III
judges in his comments, and was not describing the role of the
executive adjudicator.'56
Rather than suggest the existence of a due process right to an
independent adjudicator in agency hearing, our case law appears to be
'See Young, supra note 7, at 24
'
53Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
1541d., at 196, n. 10.
' "Young, supra note 7.
'
56Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. Louis U. L.
J. 989, text accompanying footnote 1 (1996).
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aligning with a cost-benefit analysis. Judge Posner recently described
the state of the law in an opinion resolving a challenge to the use of
hearing officers in the City of Chicago's traffic court. In Van Harken
v. City of Chicago,'s7 plaintiffs complained about the use of in-house
hearing examiners to hear challenges to citations for parking violations.
The hearing officers "are hired by, and can be fired at will by, the
City's Director of Revenue" and as such, plaintiffs contend, they may
fear losing their positions if they rule in favor of respondents too
often. 5 s Judge Posner was unmoved by this claim, observing that "[i]f
their very tenuous stake (a fear that if a hearing officer lets off too many
alleged parking violators, the Director of Revenue may get angry and
fire him) were enough to disqualify them on constitutional grounds,
elected judges, who face significant pressure from the electorate to be
"tough" on crime, would be disqualified from presiding at criminal
trials, especially in capital cases. They are not."' 59
According to Judge Posner, the due process clause "is not a
straightjacket, preventing state governments from experimenting with
more efficient methods of delivering governmental services, in this case
the provision of a municipal road system."' 6 ° Due process does not
require an independent adjudicator:
The test for due process in the sense of prodcural
minima, as set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed.2d 18 (1976),
requires a comparison of the costs and benefits of
whatever procedure the plaintiff contends is required.
The use of cost-benefit analysis to determine due
process is not to every constitutional scholar's or
"
57Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, cert denied 117 S. Ct. 1846
(1997).
1SSld., at 1353.
I91d., citing Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 1799-1800 (1997).
1Id., at 1351.
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judge's taste, but it is the analysis prescribed by the
Supreme Court and followed by the lower courts
including our own.16
The cost-benefit analysis, applied in the context of the Chicago
traffic court, yields a finding that there is no constitutional violation,
and is very much tied to fiscal realities. "The hearing officers are not,
it is true, as well insulated from the pressures of their political superiors
as administrative law judges. But they are almost certainly cheaper
(they receive $35 an hour, with no benefits, and are paid only when
they are working), a relevant consideration under the cost-benefit
formula of the Mathews case. .. ""'2 Given this analytical framework,
it would be a mistake to conclude there is a constitutional mandate
under the Due Process Clause that requires an independent adjudicator
in administrative proceedings.
Thus it seems our task as ALJs is not to erect a wall between the
adjudicator and the agency, but rather create tools that will assure that
each litigant appearing in the administrative adjudicative forum will
receive the services of an unbiased AL. Management tools, even the
humble personnel evaluation process used to develop the professional
skills of civil servants, can be an integral part of the process of ensuring
the adjudicator understands his obligation to make decisions based on
the facts and the law. Equally significant (and probably equally
problematic) is the promise of cooperation that would follow from the
use of a committee put in place to work with central panels, like that
offered as an option under the Model State Act Creating a State Central
Hearing Agency. This coexistence is consistent with the heritage of
6111d., citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53
(1993); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990); McCollum v Miller, 695 F.2d 1044,
1048 (7Th Cir. 1982); Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982); Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Artway v. Attorney
General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1251 (3d Cir. 1996).
162Id., at 1353.
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administrative agencies,'63 and is likely to enhance the adjudicative
product and the public's perception of that product.
Convergence: "Judicialization" of the Administrative Forum and
the Development of Pragmatic Alternatives for the Article III-type
Court.
The distinctions to be made between Article III-type courts and
executive adjudicators both begin and end with the public's perception
of both. From its inception, the administrative adjudicative forum is
one that survives only by remaining sensitive to immediate public
perception that the results rendered in the forum is fair."6 The trend
towards use of a central panel system is a prime example of how the
executive forum can simultaneously bow to pressure for cost-effective
delivery of judicial services while at the same time enhance the public
perception that one can receive a fair hearing before a well-informed
adjudicator. It may be many years before Article III-type courts learn
the lessons from the executive adjudicator, and begin to appreciate the
role public perception plays in the maintenance of the modem
adjudicative engine.
The effects of this evolution are already becoming apparent,
however, as Article III-type courts seek alternative ways for resolving
disputes, and in the process take on some of the important
characteristics of the administrative court, including streamlined
discovery, specialized courts, trained and qualified adjudicators, relaxed
evidentiary standards, and summary adjudications. In the final analysis,
" 
3See Walter Gellhorn, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, (1941)
(describing the history of the role of the regulated and lay community in the adjudication
process).
'"See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, "The Era of 'Risk-Risk' and the Problem of
Keeping the APA Up to Date," 63 U. C. L. REv. 1375 (1996) (noting the shift from
adjudication to rulemaking that had been detected by, among others, Justice Scalia, and
suggesting a redirection towards interagency cooperation and cooperation between the
executive, legislative and judicial branches).
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this convergence is a natural result of demands by the public for
adjudications that are fair, both in appearance and reality. As lawyers
and judges we aid the cause when we take steps that will lead to the
further evolution of both the administrative forum, as it becomes more
like the judicial model, and Article III-type courts, as they struggle with
meeting the increased need for timely and efficient adjudications.
